The author of this article, Harvey Mansfield, assures us from the outset that his article is not, in fact, a work of rape apologetics:
What with Arnold and DSK, male transgression is once again in the news. Let’s not equate the two cases—one is forgivable, the other, if the accusations are true, is not [emphasis mine]. Together with these male transgressions is the reaction to them, still more interesting.His assurances ring hollow, though, as even this first paragraph ventures into the disgusting realm of making excuses for rapists. Indeed, Mansfield starts off by drawing parallels between the marital infidelities of Arnold Schwarzenegger and the allegations against Dominique Strauss-Kahn that he raped a hotel maid. These parallels can only be held as valid if one ignores the victimization inherent in the act of rape and reduces what is an inherently violent violation of another human being to being a merely unwise decision about how to act out one's sexuality.
Equating a consensual but unwise sexual relationship with what is, by definition, a violation of a human being's right to meaningfully consent to sexuality activities is nothing short of a disgusting failure of human compassion and empathy. It is, in short, quite in keeping with the norms of the comedically misnamed "compassionate conservatism" of which the Standard is so proud.
In the very next sentence, Mansfield discards any hope he might have had for maintaining even the illusion of human compassion:
The reaction shows the power of morality to produce disgust and disgrace at the sight of these male weaknesses.Let me make this point perfectly clear. Rape is not an example of "male weakness." Period. It is a violent and heinous act perpetrated against another human being, and no amount of sugar-coating by professional misogynists like Mansfield can change that.
Bizarrely, even Mansfield himself seems to be within reach of this basic truth, as he goes on to assert that men are inherently more violent than women, and thus inherently more capable of perpetrating rape. Where he goes with this dim shadow of understanding, though, is enough to make any compassionate person cringe:
It certainly seems strange that being capable of rape can make a person better qualified for greatness, but it’s probably true.I cannot hope to do better here than to simply let that quote from Mansfield stand for itself. Indeed, Mansfield has laid bare his own view of the world, so that we may understand it for the hateful denial of human compassion that it is.
What else can I call it but a hateful abdication of empathy when Mansfield boldly declares that "[Women] are not rapists but victims of rape"? There is no compassion, no empathy and no understanding in asserting that women are inherently to be victims. Not content to leave things to be merely that disgusting, however, Mansfield continues in this vein:
Being mothers, [women] are closer to their children, and usually suffer more from divorce. Because women are weaker and closer to children than men, the equality of the sexes cannot rest on their being the same. Nor can women be independent, or “autonomous,” certainly not as much as modern women want to be. As vulnerable, they depend on law and morality for protection. The enforcement of law and morality is done mainly by men or by women with the strength of men. [...] Women need men to save them from men.I could continue to highlight how deplorable and depraved a view it is that Mansfield espouses in this article, but I shall refrain, as I think his own words have made clear how little he is bothered by the hatefulness of his statements. Instead, let me turn this around and offer some hints that he (and other professional misogynists) might gain some insight from considering.
To start with, I should point out a very simple fact that escapes far too many people (as Mansfield so clearly demonstrates): women are human beings. As such, ethical considerations which take into account the suffering of human beings invariably must take into consideration the suffering of the fifty percent of the human population which happens to be female. Living with the rest of humanity must necessarily include, then, living with that half of society that is women.
Another hint for the ethically challenged amongst us is that if one uses phrases like "male weakness" to excuse and to downplay the crime of rape, then in the same stroke, one denies the ethical consequences of suffering on the part of victims of "male weakness." Insofar as ethics are concerned, rape is important and appalling not because it is a "weakness," but because it denies a victim sovereignty over her (or his, despite Mansfield's hetero-normative and misogynistic stereotypes) own body. Naturally, it is important to understand the causes that lead to such violence, but we should not fall into the trap of mistaking the cause for the crime. We do not, for instance, refer to murder by firearms as an instance of "gun-wielder weakness," for in doing so, we would obscure the issue of ultimate importance to ethical considerations: a person's life has been extinguished through violence.
Perhaps the most helpful hint I can offer Mansfield and others suffering from an ethics deficiency, however, is a hint about what ethics actually is. Ethics is a way of codifying and understanding the well-being of fellow human beings, and in particular, the consequences for others that result from our actions. Rape is a breach of morality and ethicality not because it makes us feel icky or outraged, but because it compromises the well-being of other humans. Covering this essential truth with empty and baseless assertions about women inherently being assigned the role of "victim" does nothing to increase our understanding of the suffering that is caused to a woman if she is raped. As such, these stereotypes do not enable us to reach a higher understanding of ethics, but obscures the violent results of a violent act. A woman is not a victim by virtue of the nature of her birth, after all, but because someone forces her to become a victim. This is no different from if a man is made a victim by some act of violence; a clear truth made foggy by the addition of roles imposed on the basis of gender, such as the assignment of "victim" to all women made by Mansfield.
In parting, I will leave two more hints. To those genuinely concerned with ethicality, I would advise that continuing to speak out in the face of malignant pseudo-ethical arguments such as those made by Mansfield can help to make a difference. There is naught to be gained, after all, by staying silent and letting spread an unethical standard such as is portrayed by the Standard. Finally, to the ethically-challenged, I advise that a bit of careful listening to the arguments made by the rest of society can help elucidate why certain actions, like rape, are ethically deplorable. Circling the wagons in the face of evidence of a violent act does not help anyone learn to better live in society, and closes one off to a deeper understanding of the ethics which can act to minimize suffering amongst our peers. In short, we should seek to understand rape, not excuse it.
3 comments:
I'm a bit puzzled by a few things that you write here. For instance:
"Rape is not an example of "male weakness." Period. It is a violent and heinous act perpetrated against another human being"
You seem to be suggesting that these two positions are mutually exclusive - but how so? They seem like they could be complementary.
Also, when you wrote this...:
"What else can I call it but a hateful abdication of empathy when Mansfield boldly declares that "[Women] are not rapists but victims of rape"? There is no compassion, no empathy and no understanding in asserting that women are inherently to be victims.."
...I wondered - are you saying that Mansfield is wrong in the substance of what he says here? Or are you saying that the style that he says it in is wrong?
Then this line seemed like a curveball:
"To start with, I should point out a very simple fact that escapes far too many people (as Mansfield so clearly demonstrates): women are human beings."
But where did he deny this? Your statement seems a bit hyperbolic. But I guess you might see the denial as implicit based on your next sentence, where you write:
"As such, ethical considerations which take into account the suffering of human beings invariably must take into consideration the suffering of the fifty percent of the human population which happens to be female"
This sentence raises a number of problems for me, but the main thing I was wondering was, what is the basis for your "ethics"? What is it that tells us what human beings as human beings deserve (compassion and whatever else)?
Let me try to clarify a few things, then. As to the first point of contention, I do think it's contradictory to ascribe rape as being a "male weakness" and to recognize it as an act of violence. Firstly, using a term like "male weakness" presupposes that men are naturally inclined to rape and are holding that tendency at bay most of the time. In doing so, it makes rape the /default/, rather than a violent aberration. Second, and more importantly, even if I grant Mansfield his assertion about "male weakness," that is not a good way of defining rape. Defining rape in that way downplays the importance of the violent victimization of another human being.
Moving along, you ask me whether I think that Mansfield is substantively wrong or stylistically ill-advised in asserting that "[women are] victims of rape." To that query, I can but answer "yes." For one thing, the Catholic Church has proved quite thoroughly that not all victims of rape are female, hence deflating the assertion that to be victimized in that way is inherently feminine. Moreover, in making his assertion, Mansfield implements one of the main objectives behind many of those rapes perpetrated against women; namely, the enforcing of male-dominant power structures by denying women sovereignty over their own bodies.
To address your next point, I never said that Mansfield explicitly denied that women are human beings, but rather that his arguments indicate quite clearly that he has not fully taken that fact to heart, as he is content to relegate to women the permanent role of "victim." To so callously disregard violence enacted against women is to neglect their humanity.
As for your final point of contention, without endorsing any specific system of ethics, I feel confident in calling unethical any purported system of ethics which results in the condoning or neglecting of violence against women. As such, I am confident in calling Mansfield unethical without resorting to a specific definition of ethics which may not be held by my readers. Implicit in this argument, however, is the assumption that the justness of an ethical standard may be determined by examining the consequences of that system. To me, that is the only reasonable standard by which to evaluate an ethical system. That such a standard has the happy effect of precluding divine command theory and other such malignant nonsenses which pass for ethical systems won't keep me up at night.
I have some differences with the first three points, but what really interests me is the last one, so let me just hone in on that last paragraph:
Your first sentence makes clear that your conclusion precedes your premises, i.e., you are defending what is a prejudice rather than the outcome of a rational analysis: you know what's right or wrong before you've actually argued through all of the relevant arguments about it. Of course, there are many powerful arguments in favour of accepting "intuitive" versions of morality like this: especially and primarily religious versions, which you seem to have contempt for though. But that point should be sufficient to make clear that defining the "justness of an ethical standard" by its consequences is hardly sufficient - since that mode of evaluation still presupposes assumptions about what just consequences are, assumptions which at some point must be spelled out and defended in order to be compelling. Anyway, this isn't to say that I'm condoning rape myself. But I would certainly want to be a lot more specific than "violence against women", because I could certainly imagine situations in which a violent action perpetrated against a woman could be justifiable or even desirable (e.g., if a woman was threatening a child with a heavy object, I would hope that someone would violently assault that woman if necessary to prevent harm to the child - and wouldn't you have to agree to that especially on "consequentialist" grounds?).
Regardless, I don't think that the form of consequentalism which you are now defending can actually do all the work you need it to do in order to ground the morality which you attempt to defend in the original post: how does it tell us how is owed compassion and why, for example? how can it justify the idea that human beings as human beings are owed anything at all (respect, equality, empathy, compassion, etc.)? Maybe it's possible, but I'm not seeing how.
Post a Comment